Introduction
Risk is often a loosely defined term that expresses the chance of an undesirable event occurring as a result of some activity or action (including ''no action''). Crucial to our understanding of risk is that it is associated with undesirable, and often unforeseen, events. Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) has its origins in the nuclear and space industries, but in the last 20 years or so has gained a more widespread acceptance in the oil, petrochemical and chemical process industries, and indeed for many other industrial applications where the consequences of an undesirable event are potentially disastrous.
QRA is a rigorous, logical and iterative risk analysis procedure, which can be formally defined as the quantitative evaluation of the likelihood of undesired events, and the likelihood of harm or damage being caused, together with judgements concerning the significance of these results. The key points are that the assessment is quantitative and that risk has two components: the probability of occurrence of an undesired event and the consequences of that event. The quantitative nature of QRA is often confused with an ''objective strength of character''. In reality, however, the distinction between objective and subjective risk assessment is at best blurred and more often than not artificial. The strength of QRA lies not in its objective stance but rather in the manner that it treats subjective input.
Under the definition provided above, QRA can be viewed as a five stage procedure entailing:
(1) the identification of hazards or potential undesirable events; (2) an analysis of the frequency or likelihood of occurrence of these events; (3) an assessment of the effects or impacts should the undesired events be realized; (4) calculation of the risk, expressed as a product of the probability of an undesired event and its consequences; and, (5) an examination of the significance of the results often in the wider context of other social, economic or political concerns. All risk assessments must work towards an endpoint. Endpoints are the expression of consequence and an expression of the values that are to be protected by the assessment procedure (Bartell et al., 1992) and distinguish traditional QRA (human fatality endpoints) from ecological risk assessment (environmental value endpoints). In theory ecological endpoints can be any one of numerous structural and functional ecosystem components; for example the elimination of a commercially valuable species or an overall reduction in primary production. In complex ecological systems, however, the assessor may be unaware of what endpoints are most appropriate or important, and may have to distinguish between those endpoints that can be measured (measurement endpoints) and those endpoints that are of ecological significance (assessment endpoints), extrapolating from one to the other (USEPA, 1992) .
Ecological risk assessment faces additional problems. Ecological systems are complex, stochastic and their system dynamics typically scale-dependent. It is very difficult therefore, to conduct the inductive, modelling approach to frequency and consequence assessment that characterizes many traditional engineering QRA's. Despite these difficulties the QRA approach to ecological risks is well recommended. The ''doing it'', that is the analytical and assessment process required by QRA forces the assessor to critically scrutinize and examine the system in question in a logical and creative manner. This of itself is a useful exercise. Furthermore complexity within the analysis can be managed by choosing appropriate, possibly lower order, endpoints allowing a simpler analysis but one that maintains utility to decision makers (Side et al., 1997) .
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the means by which a quantitative assessment of ballast water introduction risk might be achieved. The importance of this is seen in terms of the need to identify cost-efficient strategies for ballast water management. The approach is illustrated by reference to a hypothetical biocide treatment strategy.
Ballast water introductions and management strategies Carlton (1986) has proposed a simple model illustrating the chain of events that precede ballast water introductions (Fig. 1) . Ballast water management strategies attempt to break this chain, and this break can be made at any one of a number of points, or at a combination of points. There are therefore a large variety of different management strategies. Indeed Carlton et al. (1995) suggest that there are at least 32 different management options, reproduced in Table 1 . Whilst some of these options are mutually exclusive, combinations of those options that are not, allows many more strategies to be applied in any given situation.
It seems reasonable to assume that any individual strategy is unlikely to be equally cost-effective for all vessels at all ports of arrival and departure. It would seem unreasonable, therefore, to impose a blanket strategy across the shipping industry as a whole. If we accept this line of reasoning, we are naturally led to the conclusion that the implementation of ballast water management strategies should be done on a case-by-case basis. But on what basis should one strategy be chosen over another? It is suggested here that a quantified ecological risk assessment approach to determining the probability of management strategy failure, and the consequences of such, provides a defensible means by which to test cost efficiency, and thereby provide effective decision criteria for such a case-by-case evaluation.
The most cost-efficient management strategy (or combination of strategies) can be defined as that option(s) which exhibits the highest risk reduction per unit cost. The endpoint towards which the risk assessment is directed becomes failure of any given management strategy. In this context we can distinguish between operational failure (or simple inefficiency) and accidental failure. For the main part this discussion will focus on the operational efficiency of control options, but the techniques discussed are equally applicable to an accidental event analysis.
The risk of control failure has two components: the frequency with which failure occurs and the consequences of such. Consider, for example, strategies designed to prevent organisms taken onboard with ballast. Failure is defined as organisms taken on board. The frequency with which this event occurs (either operationally or accidentally) and the consequences of failure -expressed as the number of organisms taken on board -defines the risk of failure. It is possible therefore, to envisage a series of ''nested'' risk assessment endpoints (nested in the sense of Russian dolls), applying to the various control strategies within the ballast Figure 1 . The ballast water introduction cycle (after Carlton, 1986). water introduction cycle, as illustrated in Figure 2 . A biocide risk assessment would be directed at the second endpoint, i.e. ensuring that no organisms survived the journey. Note also the distinction between endpoints three and four. This distinction is drawn because the likelihood of establishment (fourth endpoint) following the introduction of a non-native into an environment in which it can survive (third endpoint) may be difficult to determine with a sufficient degree of confidence. In practice choosing the third, lower-order endpoint may allow a confident expression of risk that is of more use to decision makers, particularly for species that are a priori considered as marine pests (Side et al., 1997) .
The objective then of the risk assessment process is to quantify the risk of management strategy failure, allowing a comparative cost utility function to be determined Table 1 . Ballast water and sediment management options (Carlton et al. 1995 on a case-by-case basis. Importantly, however, this approach also allows a quantitative assessment of the efficacy of combined option strategies. Applying Boolean logic, for example, to the probability of failure of any single strategy allows a determination of the probability of failure of two (or more) options in a serial or parallel fashion.
A suggested approach for ballast water risk assessment
In theory quantitative risk assessment techniques should allow the determination of the most cost-efficient combination of control options under any given circumstances. In practice, however, the assessor will be faced with many of the difficulties associated with quantitative ecological risk assessment outlined earlier.
The hurdles that such assessments are likely to encounter, and some of the techniques currently available to tackle them, are perhaps best illustrated by a hypothetical example. Let us consider the use of a chemical biocide as a ballast treatment option subjected to a hypothetical risk assessment.
Hazard identification
The first stage of QRA is hazard identification. The hazard identification stage should elicit those events or sequences of events that contribute to a biocide's failure to eliminate organisms within the ballast tank environment. There are a number of techniques employed within an industrial context to identify hazards. Many of these techniques provide structured ways to identify hazards by prompting those familiar with the system in question to apply their expertise in a rigorous and logical manner. For example, fault tree analysis forces the assessor to consider the necessary events that contribute to the endpoint in question. A supplementary approach is HAZOP (Hazard and Operability) analysis, which uses guide words to prompt ''what if'' type questions for each component of the system. In this manner the assessor is encouraged to apply foresight and an inductive approach to determine potential hazards. A simple example of a fault tree analysis for a ballast water introduction subject to a biocide control strategy is illustrated in Figure 3 , whilst Table 2 provides a simple HAZOP analysis for this strategy.
Frequency analysis
The purpose of the frequency analysis is to estimate the probability or frequency of the undesired events identified in the first stages of the risk assessment process. In this context the frequency analysis would aim to quantify the inoculation frequency of vessels and the probability of failure of any given control strategy. The frequency of failure is then determined as a function of vessel trips, journey duration and ballasting events. In a traditional industrial QRA, frequency analysis is undertaken in one of two alternative ways:
(1) quantify the extent to which the system in question has failed in the past, deriving an empirically based failure frequency rate; or (2) if such data are unavailable, break down the failure event to its contributing components for which data are available and use Boolean logic to determine the overall probability of failure. Frequency analysis within an ecological risk assessment, however, is considerably more difficult. In the first instance it is very unlikely that a historical database of failure incidence will exist: for ballast water management strategies no such database has been gathered to date. Furthermore establishing probability functions for the contributing events to failure requires that the system in question is ''completely described'', i.e. can be mapped down to the level of a set of initial contributing events that are exhaustive. Ecological systems, however, are generally too complex to define such a set and thus some inductive modelling is usually required.
For the biocide control option considered above, the assessment endpoint is survival of organisms within the treated ballast water. Because of the previous arguments it is very unlikely that the frequency of vessel inoculation and species survival could be properly represented by a single parameter and would therefore be better expressed as a size/probability distribution describing the numbers of organisms of a given species surviving the journey (route) in question. There are three components to this:
(1) the inoculation density; (2) the ''natural'' birth-death processes which occur within the ballast tank population; and, (3) the effect of the control strategy (biocide) on these processes. In effect the aim of the control strategy is to push the ballast tank population to extinction. It is worth noting that the population of the ballast tank environment properly satisfies the ecological definition of a ''closed population' ' (McArdle, 1993) , in so much as once the ballast operation is completed, there is usually no further immigration/emigration to or from the population over the duration of the voyage. In theory this simplifies the subsequent risk assessment. The ballast tank environment is more akin to a mesocosm than an ecosystem, in which it is easier to model population dynamics.
The inoculation density
The inoculation density (i.e. the number of individuals at the start of the journey) describes event C in Figure 3 . This is arguably one of the most important components of ballast water risk because it underlies all subsequent components of the assessment. Unfortunately this component is also one of the most difficult to predict with any degree of confidence. The number of individuals at the start of a given journey comprises:
(1) the number entrained in the ballast water taken onboard by the vessel (event A); and, (2) the number ''carried over'' from previous journeys (event B). This can be established by ballast tank sampling but delays in collecting, identifying and counting individual organisms may undermine the predictive utility of the assessment. Furthermore the sampling distribution of the statistic (the count) must also be determined in order to allow the determination of confidence intervals. Modelling inoculation densities requires a full understanding of the species' life cycle, its distribution in the port in question, and the port's circulation patterns. Lack of this understanding remains a fundamental stumbling block to quantified ballast water risk assessment and underlines the importance of further directed field work.
The natural birth-death processes
The frequency analysis must also define the abiotic and biotic components of the ballast tank environment. These are the ''ecosystem characteristics'' that provide the context for the assessment (USEPA, 1992). As noted above the clearly defined spatial and temporal limits to Inadequate treatment through all ballast water tanks over journey time this environment, and the closed population dynamics within it, suggest that this analysis should be considerably simpler than that for a ''real world'' ecosystem. The abiotic components of this environment can be defined as the journey time, ballast water volume and ballast tank conditions. The biotic components, however, are more intractable. In a simple deterministic analysis the population dynamics of any given species within this environment, assuming instantaneous rates of change in the initial inoculum, can be expressed as
which has the solution
where P 0 represents the initial population, i.e. the number of individuals taken onboard during ballasting, t is the journey time, b the instantaneous birth rate, and d the instantaneous death rate. Equation 1 provides a very simple model that assumes constant birth and death rates and ignores such factors as food supply, density dependence, predation, etc. There are numerous techniques to incorporate predator prey interactions (see for example Pimm, 1982; Yodzis, 1994) , trophic interactions (see for example Christensen, 1992; Ulanowicz, 1992) and to explicitly acknowledge the influence of dependent, independent and intervening variables (Buncher et al., 1991) . In all such approaches, from the simplest to the most complex, however, the veracity of the analysis is dictated by the parameter values incorporated into the modelling. This can be established empirically from recorded journey survivorship studies, see for example Wonham et al. (1996) or Murphy (1997) . Alternatively the assessor could establish intrinsic birth and death rates, predator functional responses, etc. by reproducing the ballast tank environment in the laboratory and measuring the population dynamics. Indeed this approach has already been adopted to test the efficacy of various ballast tank disinfection options (Muller and Reynolds, 1995) .
The techniques outlined above are deterministic in nature. The assesors' uncertainty regarding stochastic influences during a single journey should properly be expressed via a distribution of possible population sizes at the end of the journey, as illustrated in Figure 4 . In a stochastic model such as this, parameter distributions replace the actual frequency distributions generated by repeated iterations of the processes in question (i.e. repeated journeys). Where the empirical frequency distributions are unknown, as is likely to be the case for ballast water introductions, a deterministic model (such as that represented by Equation 1) can be made to mimic stochastic behaviour by Monte Carlo sampling of the parameter values from suspected distributions. The incorporation of a priori information regarding the realistic limits to the system in question can improve the simulations considerably (O'Neill et al., 1982) .
Effect of the control strategy
The efficacy of the control strategy is described by those events contributing to event D in Figure 3 . The simple hazard identification exercise undertaken for this biocide example suggests that the following events could potentially contribute to the failure endpoint:
(1) inadequate biocide concentration; (2) species resistance to the biocide either generally or at a specific lifecycle stage; (3) inadequate coverage of all parts of the ballast water environment; and, (4) inadequate ''treatment'' time. The efficacy of the control strategy can be investigated with ecotoxicological risk assessment techniques which aim to ensure little or no impact upon components of an environment receiving a chemical contaminant. Here, however, the assessment is attempting to ensure complete impact on the receiving environment. A ballast water control strategy can thus be likened to an environmental stressor whose objective is to drive nonindigenous populations to extinction. With this analogy in mind the assessor can draw upon a host of risk assessment techniques. A simple deterministic analysis may define effectiveness as the LC 100 /PEC quotient, representing the laboratory-established concentration that is lethal to all of the test individuals, over the Predicted Environmental Concentration (PEC). A more realistic analysis, however, would consider the effects and exposure profile (USEPA, 1992) of the stressor, which in this example could include:
(1) LC 100 effects profile -species sensitivity versus dose (biological uptake variation) persistence, bio-degradation, environmental partitioning, laboratory-environment extrapolation error, time to LC 100 ; and, (2) PEC exposure profile -fate and transport of biocide through ballast tank environment. A simple consideration of stochastic influences on both the effects and exposure profile, as illustrated in Figure 5 , allows the determination of the probability of effect of the control option, which in turn defines the probability of failure. The synthesis of these considerations with the results of the hazard identification stage provides the assessor with a checklist with which to investigate potential control failure scenarios and the frequency with which they could be expected to occur. This simple analysis suggests that the assessor should investigate life-stage and species-specific toxicological benchmarks, biocide dispersion within the ballast tank environment and the time to the benchmark in relation to the journey duration.
Consequence assessment
The consequences of control strategy failure are expressed in terms of the number of species, and number of individuals, surviving to the next stage of the ballast introduction cycle. The significance of failure is also clearly a function of how far the survivors reach in the ballast water cycle. Determining the number of individuals surviving beyond a particular control option is critical to an estimation of the likely effects of control strategy failure because small populations are considerd to be more vulnerable to extinction -a phenomena generally referred to as the ''Allee'' effect (Williamson, 1989) . The Allee effect manifests itself because small populations face the risk of extinction from demographic accidents -the chance fluctuations of birth and death rates -and from extreme environmental events. The concept is closely linked to that of a Minimum Viable Population (MVP) size and Population Viability Analysis (PVA). PVA is a process in which the likelihood that a population will become extinct is assessed within a specified time and under particular circumstances (Possingham et al., 1993) .
The importance of the extinction analogy is that conservation biology risk assessment techniques provide a clear means to establish the likelihood that a given population will become extinct, and that a control strategy may not have to eliminate all individuals to ensure eventual extinction, i.e. non-establishment of an introduced species. In the simple biocide example above the number of individuals progressing to event E in Figure 3 could be expressed
where represents the percentage mortality induced by the biocide treatment over the journey duration, derivable from the dose-time-response relationship and PEC for the biocide in question. Again Monte Carlo simulation techniques can be used to mimic stochastic variability in b, d and . The resulting population density function could then be used as a basis for the extinction simulations described by Burgman et al. (1993) .
These considerations suggest that a biocide treatment need not be 100% effective, and thus its efficiacy need not be gauged against a LC 100 reference. Alternative, less onerous test references could be linked to a minimum PVA presuming knowledge of the inoculation density and establishment likelihood/population curve. Such an approach, however, may not be equally appropriate for all species. Toxic dinoflagellate introductions, for example, are thought to be characterized by potentially very high inoculation densities coupled with potentially very low MVPs in suitable environments. Under these conditions ballast water treatments would need to be at levels of effectiveness well above 99% in order to make an appreciable difference to the risk of establishment (AQIS, 1994) . Furthermore it is doubtful whether the concept of population viability is likely to be sufficiently developed to control or predict establishment on a case-by-case basis. Were this the case, the assessor could only safely assume that the greater the population surviving to the next stage, the higher the probability that the species would progress through the ballast cycle and become established in a new receiving environment. A practical means forward is then to seek that control strategy, or combination of control options, that minimizes this size probability function in the most costefficient manner. (a) Figure 5 . Stochastic influence on exposure/effects profile for chemical biocide -the probability of biocide effectiveness (adapted from Schobben and Scholten, 1993) . Figure (a) represents a distribution of potential Predicted Environmental Concentration (PEC) compared to a single LC 100 for the species in question. The estimated efficacy of the control option (the shaded area) is expressed as the probability of LC 100 <PEC. Alternatively Figure (b) represents a distribution of single species LC 100 compared to an assumed homogenous PEC in the ballast tank environment. The efficacy of the control option (the shaded area) is expressed as the probability of PEC>LC 100 . Combination of a and b above (Fig. c) , produces an integrated efficacy probability. This integral probability can be calculated by multiplying the inverse cumulative probabilities of PEC with the frequency distribution representing LC 100 .
Risk assessment
In the penultimate stage of QRA risk is expressed as a function of the frequency (or probability) of undesired events and the consequence of these events. The result of the ballast water risk assessment would ideally be a cumulative probability distribution function expressing the probability that x% of the initial inoculum survives the control option. As stated above this may allow some determiantion of the likelihood of subsequent growth and establishment of the non-indigenous species. Even where this cannot be established, however, the assessment exercise is a useful one if it is able to identify the most cost-efficient means of minimizing this probability distribution function.
Uncertainty assessment he estimation of risk in any assessment should properly be accompanied by an expression of the uncertainty in the results of the analysis, and the extent to which this uncertainty influences the subsequent conclusions of the assessment. Uncertainty analysis plays a critical role in providing a basis for selecting among alternative management options and deciding if and what additional information is needed (Reckhow, 1994) . Uncertainty has been described as, ''a measure of incompleteness of one's knowledge or information about a quantity whose true value could be established if a perfect measuring device were available'' (Taylor, 1993) . It is important to recognize, however, that this is only applicable to empirical quantities, and that the risk assessor and decision maker may be faced with uncertainty regarding decision variables or value parameters which may not have a ''true value'' (Morgan and Henrion, 1990) , or which may in principle be ''irreducible'' with current scientific methods (Faber et al., 1992) . The major sources of uncertainty in a ballast water risk assessment are likely to be measurement error, stochastic variability and modelling approximation. The determination of sampling error, for example, is likely to be critical in ballast water management strategies when distinguishing between sampled structural zeros (the population is extinct), and sampling zeros that are due to sampling error when the population is really present (McArdle, 1993) . Table 3 provides a summary of some types of uncertainty that may be encountered during a ballast water management risk assessment, together with some of the techniques available to address these. Adapted after Morgan and Henrion, 1990 .
Discussion
Environmental improvement strategies are often implemented under the auspices of cost-benefit or risk-benefit assessments. If we accept this approach for ballast water control strategies (as opposed to the zero risk tolerance approach) then quantified risk assessment provides a means of establishing the cost utility of individual or combined control options. This cost utility is expressed as the probability of strategy failure multiplied by the cost of implementing the control strategy. Ballast water management exhibits an important asymmetry in that the introduction of control strategies ensures higher shipping costs for a probable reduction in environmental risk (AQIS, 1994) . Determining cost utility within a probabilistic quantified risk assessment framework is therefore an appropriate approach. Ballast water introduction risk assessment exhibits a curious mixture of ecological and more traditional risk analysis problems: the population dynamics and establishment of a non-indigenous species entails the stochastic complexity of biological modelling but within a mesocosm-like environment whose variables are relatively well defined. QRA, traditionally employed within the chemical and nuclear process industries, seems to be an appropriate framework with which to address these issues.
There are a number of points within the ballast/ deballast procedure where the chain of events leading to an introduction can be interrupted. The significance of the probability of failure of control strategies at different stages in the chain, however, are not equal when viewed in light of the overall objective of any management strategy, i.e. the prevention of the introduction of non-indigenous species. The cost-utility function described above can only be compared across control options acting at the same point within the ballast cycle unless some allowance is subsequently made for the probability of organisms progressing through the chain becoming established as alien species.
In this context, conservation risk assessment techniques can further contribute to the evaluation that a given population size, surviving a particular control strategy, will progress to extinction or not. Two conclusions are evident from these considerations:
(1) that a given control strategy need not necessarily eliminate all organisms to ensure that the surviving population does not establish itself; and, (2) the most cost-effective control strategies may prove to be those that entail combinations of control options, working in harmony with the ballast/ deballast cycle, to drive inoculum populations to extinction. Quantified ecological risk assessment provides a means by which to investigate and quantify the extent of control strategy elimination, the likelihood of surviving population establishment and the efficacy of combined control options.
The ballast water introduction cycle is undoubtedly complex. Separating this cycle into its component parts, however, provides manageable risk assessment units. By focusing on the component parts of the cycle the assessor is able to reduce a complex procedure into clearly defined subsystems, as exemplified by the nested endpoint approach of Figure 2 . This encourages precision in assessment results and helps to avoid very large uncertainties that may effectively render the assessment useless as a decision aid. Introductions of non-native species via ballast water is species-, journey-and environmentspecific. Any assessment that fails to address each of these elements is unlikely to be successful. This, together with the large number of potential ballast water management strategies, suggests that the data requirements of a quantitative ballast water risk assessment are likely to be large and that assessments should be undertaken on a case-by-case basis.
In practice a central agency will undoubtedly be required in order to implement the assessment. The most appropriate agency must necessarily be one that has full understanding of national shipping activity and access to route-and vessel-specific information, i.e. last port of departure, journey time, first port of arrival, and vessel type, ballast capacity, etc. In the first instance developing the assessment framework around a target list of species would seem a sensible approach. Species information can then be generated, which in conjunction with journey and vessel details will allow a case-specific evaluation in which a case is defined as a combination of vessel, two ports and a species life stage.
It is anticipated that assessments of this type will quickly identify high and low risk routes by virtue, for example, of journey duration, for particular species grouping such as dinfolagellate cysts or zooplankton larvae. It is also anticipated that in a large majority of cases an assessment of risk could be made at a very early stage in the vessel's itinerary, on the basis of conditions at the port of ballast and the stated first port of deballast. This maximizes the time available to the relevant regulatory authority and shipping agencies to decide on the most appropriate management strategies, if any, required, and may also allow shipping operators to pro-actively alter their operations in order to minimize the risk of viable non-native discharges. In both instances this approach minimizes the impediment placed upon the industry as a whole.
For those vessels whose route is not fixed in advance but dictated by the availability of commercially advantageous trade, this will clearly not be possible. In this instance a retrospective assessment of risk can only be made once the vessel requests permission to enter port and deballast, on the basis of the origin of its ballast water and age.
